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From WMD to WME: An Ever-Expanding Threat Spectrum
Abstract
One of the challenges the United States and its intelligence community confronts today, if
not the foremost challenge, is the girth of its national security problem set. The array of
threat types, as well as the potential sources of those threats, is unprecedented and
growing. The burdensome task for intelligence at all times, but especially given the present
rate of change and the increasing porosity of borders, is to try to cope with an escalating
mix of challenges and rising expectations of what intelligence can provide. Existing tasks
persist; they are not replaced. The number and types of potentially threatening actors have
exploded. Nation-states are now joined by countless ethno-religious groupings, terrorists,
criminals of all stripes, drug cartels, transnational movements and issue groups, and
malevolent and delinquent individuals. Threats come from all quarters and in all sizes these
days, and the mission of intelligence, i.e., to track indicators to provide warning and to
reduce uncertainty for decision-makers, is monumental.
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Introduction
“The world is a more dangerous and unpredictable place than it has been since the end
of the cold war….”1
One of the challenges the United States and its intelligence community confronts today,
if not the foremost challenge, is the girth of its national security problem set. The array
of threat types, as well as the potential sources of those threats, is unprecedented and
growing. The burdensome task for intelligence at all times, but especially given the
present rate of change and the increasing porosity of borders, is to try to cope with an
escalating mix of challenges and rising expectations of what intelligence can provide.
Existing tasks persist; they are not replaced. The number and types of potentially
threatening actors have exploded. Nation-states are now joined by countless ethnoreligious groupings, terrorists, criminals of all stripes, drug cartels, transnational
movements and issue groups, and malevolent and delinquent individuals. Threats come
from all quarters and in all sizes these days, and the mission of intelligence, i.e., to track
indicators to provide warning and to reduce uncertainty for decision-makers, is
monumental.
The objective of this brief discussion is to sketch some of that threat complexity across a
sweeping continuum that continues to evolve, as hostile actors seek to take advantage of
any U.S. vulnerability that will succumb to their objectives. And, sadly, the older, preexisting WMD concerns are not replaced as the spectrum changes but are simply
expanded upon. We also now encounter heightened concerns about insider threats. The
U.S. has to contend with a revolutionary dispersal of power: nation-states have seen
both non-state actors and individuals equipped with the ability to wreak havoc
undeterred by the threat of criminal justice or retaliation, or even of discovery. In the
words of the most recent iteration of the United States’ National Security Strategy,
published by the White House in February 2015,
“[the increasing interdependence of the global economy and the rapid pace of
technological change] create shared vulnerabilities, as interconnected systems
and sectors are susceptible to the threats of climate change, malicious cyber
activity, pandemic diseases, and transnational terrorism and crime.”2
(Emphases added.)
After the denouement of the Cold War, Western intelligence focused heavily on regional
and intra-state conflict issues and the consequences of the Soviet Union’s demise. A
metaphor for the post-Cold War transformation employed by two former CIA directors
(and others) has it that, in the case of the Soviet Union, the West faced one huge dragon,
an enemy that was easy to identify but impossible to eliminate. Now, however, we
confront hordes of venomous snakes, ones relatively easy to kill but nearly impossible to

Philip Stephens, “Cameron takes a Holiday from the World,” Financial Times, March 20, 2015, 11.
The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2015 (Washington, D.C.:
The White House, February 2015).
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find.3 With the dissolution of the USSR twenty-five years ago, China seemed to be the
next big issue for intelligence in the United States – until 9/11 when al Qaeda suddenly
assumed prominence for Americans and devoured huge security resources. While the
U.S. was preoccupied with transnational terrorism, letting some earlier priorities slip,
the vast and vexing cyber phenomenon then sprouted up to challenge terrorism (or too
often is combined with it) for pride of place in U.S. intelligence and national security
concerns.
In the last two decades or so, the U.S. intelligence community has also seen its list of
tasks expanded to include climate change questions, pandemics, a host of non-state
actors, self-radicalized extremists, and more. And, since the 9/11 attacks fourteen years
ago, U.S. intelligence has been in what it deems a full-court press against terrorism
worldwide, with a special focus on the threat of possible weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) employment – or the threat of it – by terrorists, be they Islamists or others.
Thus, in today’s world, resort by extremists to carrying out various types of terrorism (or
threatening its use) is taken by U.S. intelligence agencies to be a given. What is not static,
however, is the spectrum of risk and vulnerability to threats, articulated or realized.
WMD and the possible destruction of many lives and a large city or part of the nation’s
infrastructure is no longer our sole or, perhaps, even most pressing concern. Thus, a key
challenge for intelligence in this twenty-first century will be to better anticipate,
understand and respond to a much wider, more complex threat spectrum.4
Complicating that challenge is what might be called a post-9/11 letdown when it comes
to U.S. intelligence manning and budgeting, both of which are threatened with large
cuts, meaning fewer personnel to deal with more issues and concerns that emanate from
many more potential sources.
A hearty perennial threat remains the problem set of nuclear and other weapons of mass
destruction. The world has been in the throes of WMD concerns for at least a century by
now, beginning with gas attacks in World War I through Enola Gay and
Hiroshima/Nagasaki to the continuing nuclear stand-off involving the two nuclear
superpowers and lesser nuclear weapons states and aspirants.5 Thus, the threat of some
form of WMD in warfare has long been with us, recalling the earlier nomenclature of
ABC weapons – atomic, biological and chemical. After the sarin poison gas attacks in the
Tokyo subway system by the messianic terrorist group Aum Shinriyko in 1995, the fear
was realized that a non-state actor (undeterred by traditional state to state counter-force
capacity) might resort to WMD as a terrorist technique. Today, however, the more likely,
practicable threat may well be the disabling of a massive subway system in a metropolis,
short of resort to deadly force. Regardless of intent, in all WMD cases U.S. intelligence

The author has heard these attributed both to R. James Woolsey and USAF General Michael Hayden.
For a much deeper treatment of key aspects of this issue, see Joseph S. Nye, Jr. The Future of Power,
and his Viewpoint re “Power Shifts,” Time, May 9, 2011. Nye characterizes those shifts as power
transition and power diffusion, with the latter “more difficult to manage…” He adds that “…for all the
fashionable predictions that China, India or Brazil will surpass the U.S. in the next few decades, the
greater threats may come from modern barbarians and nonstate actors.” (Time, 29)
5 German forces used chlorine gas against the French in April 1915, marking the advent of chemical
weapons warfare.
3
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has been tasked with collecting against such potentialities, analyzing their likelihood,
and helping to come up with counter-measures.
Threats without Borders
WMD have long been seen as the ultimate threat to world civilization and, more recently,
of mass casualty terrorism. But weapons of mass destruction are not our only, most
likely, or even most persistent source of worry. The overall national security threat must
now be more accurately understood as a variety of new threats stemming from what I
call WME – weapons of mass effects. Destruction is only one element of this broad
range of potential, plausible threats to the U.S. and other societies. The challenge to
both U.S. policy and intelligence in the coming years is every bit as likely to come from
capabilities of adversaries to massively disable, damage, disrupt, and deceive – without
resort to outright destruction. “The most significant risks to the United States in
cyberspace are daily cyber attacks that undermine our national economic
competitiveness.”6
Hide and Seek – or Catch Me if You Can
When intelligence and other risk analysts examine future scenarios, they tend to assess
both the probability of occurrence as well as potential impact. Some instances, including
possible terrorist possession of a nuclear device, are still rated as having low probability
but threatening a high impact. However, when it comes to weapons of mass effects,
e.g., a cyber attack to deny service or disrupt or damage a critical system, such scenarios
are fast becoming threats deemed to pose both high probability and high impact. In the
words of the Defense Intelligence Agency’s Chief Analytic Methodologist Josh Kerbel,
the earlier understanding that “there is proportionality between input and output – that
a small action will lead to a small outcome or effect and that a large input will lead to a
large outcome” is both misleading and encourages linear, “past is prologue” analysis.7
The few can, in fact, inflict great harm.
Thanks largely to the rapid trajectories of globalizing, trans-border interconnectedness
and the spiraling advance of information and communications technology, tomorrow’s
world is likely to become inordinately more complicated. In the words of Financial
Times commentator Philip Stephens: “The end of history has made way for the era of
systemic disorder….The cold war was dangerous but stable. The great unwinding has
created a world that is dangerously unpredictable.” 8 Moreover, it appears likely to
become more dangerous due to malevolent uses of these globally-employable electronic
capabilities. Intelligence has yet to come to grips with the array of threatening issues
raised in the cyber realm or in effectively understanding and exploiting social media – a
phenomenon that could become increasingly impenetrable depending on the outcome of
Securing Cyberspace: A New Domain for National Security, Nicholas Burns and Jonathon Price (eds.)
(Washington, D.C.: The Aspen Institute, 2012), 51.
7 Josh Kerbel, “The U.S. Intelligence Community’s Creativity Challenge,” The National Interest, October
13, 2014, available at: http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-us-intelligence-communitys-creativitychallenge-11451?page=show.
8 Philip Stephens, “Why the Business of Risk is Booming,” Financial Times, March 13, 2015, 11.
6
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the worldwide debate over social media transparency versus privacy. Indeed, given the
telescoping of time and distance by this globe-spanning electronic connectedness, one
might suggest that Francis Fukuyama’s thesis on the “end of history” might just as well
have focused on the “end of geography.”9
Seeking Needles in All the World’s Hay
This discussion does not purport to focus on the intricacies and plausible further
advances in technology. Instead, it seeks to raise basic questions as to how impermeable
a future world may become for those tasked with making sense of it, while seeking to
provide U.S. national and homeland security decision-makers with intelligence warning
and estimates. Intelligence’s ability to actually achieve this – given galloping
international complexity, overwhelming amounts of communications, and burgeoning
denial of access to the huge explosion of social media – will be daunting and most likely
diminished. During the Cold War, the United States and its allies sought to obtain
information and insights into “denied areas” (many of them lying behind Churchill’s
“iron curtain”) using every means available – human and technical intelligence,
diplomats and defense attaches, private citizens, defectors, underground literature, and
more. But those areas where Western access was difficult, often impossible, to obtain
were physically and geographically limited. They were closed societies, seeking to keep
their people ignorant and bottled up, while holding outsiders – and their information
and news – at bay.
In today’s world, intelligence confronts “technological denied areas” in the form of social
media, encrypted communications, and an explosion of different ways and venues for
global exchange of useful information, along with threats, recruitment into fanaticism,
Internet-conveyed radicalization and terrorist know-how, and other malevolent content.
Moreover, determining the origin (and, thus, the motivation and plausibility) of various
threats is inordinately complicated by anonymity and global reach via the Internet.
Years ago, France declared that its defense policy needed to be postured against all
potential adversaries, i.e., a defense against threats from “all directions” of the compass,
although even then Paris had a limited geography and range of potential enemies in
view. Today, the United States and other democracies must muster another defense in
“all directions,” even as they face an undefinable, variegated array of threats. The
challenge is further complicated by the likely anonymity of many threats’ origins, a
major capacity for electronic and operational deception, and a vastly broader, layered
threat spectrum.
“Terrorist groups could also wreak havoc by attacking the information systems
that control electricity for hospitals, air traffic radar, or banking transactions.
Such attacks could be perpetrated with high explosives at the sites of key server
computers, but they could also be carried out transnationally by computer
hackers tens of thousands of miles away. Deterrence does not provide adequate
This idea was voiced by Dr. Liam Fox, Member of the UK Parliament and former British Defense
Secretary, in a discussion of US-UK relations at the Center for Strategic and International Studies,
Washington, D.C. March 2, 2015.
9
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protections against terrorist threats because there is sometimes no return
address against which to retaliate….”10
While the Internet is a boon in the majority of today’s modern societies where it is
available and in use, it also enables anti-social forces – from terrorist organizations to
“lone wolves” to criminal syndicates – with the means to steal identities, attack and
disable infrastructures, and endanger whole societies (and the instruments and
institutions upon which they depend for safe food, clean water, dependable energy,
financial transactions, reliable and safe transport, and more). The deaths and
devastation of the 9/11 attacks remain the touchstone for American thinking about, and
fears of, terrorism. However, shutting down a major power grid,11 disrupting the
nation’s banking or check/credit card clearing functions, poisoning a major water source,
or spreading fear of contagious diseases, either real or virtual, threaten to be significant
factors and major challenges in trying to ensure future U.S. national security and the
“general welfare.” Recall the Ebola scare of 2014, a pandemic with no known human
agency involved, aside from contagion. Then envision someone purposely weaponizing
such a disease to use as a biological agent, posing a much more virulent, worrisome
threat.
Social Media – The Good, Bad and Ugly for Intelligence
American society, and the intelligence community that is engaged in trying to protect it
and advance its interests, are heavily focused on social media. Some users worry that
they and their privacy are threatened by an overly intrusive, threat-obsessed
government. On the other hand, there is the concomitant worry that social media
themselves have undercut the viability of personal privacy, once one embraces their use.
Social media do not spawn conflicts, but they have already demonstrated the power to
ignite a conflagration based on a few sparks, with the so-called Arab Spring a case in
point. The widespread, often violent, nationwide outbreaks of protests and sporadic
violence over the grand jury decision in the Ferguson, Missouri police shooting of
Michael Brown and others in 2015 illustrate the point.
Intelligence confronts the reality of social media from several different perspectives. To
begin with, people working in the classified, sensitive U.S. intelligence enterprise are
cautioned by their security watchdogs to minimize, if not avoid, exposing personal
information in social media, e.g., on LinkedIn, Facebook, Instagram and the like. That is
largely based on counterintelligence and personnel security concerns. However, the
argument against being active in social media often is either unconvincing to users or
totally wasted breath for those who have grown up in a world drenched with social
media.
Nye, Jr., Joseph S., Understanding International Conflicts, 6th ed. (New York: Pearson, 2007), 273.
In testimony before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in November 2014,
National Security Agency Director Admiral Michael Rogers was quoted as saying that “China and
‘probably one of two other’ countries have the capacity to shut down the nation’s power grid and other
critical infrastructure through a cyber attack...” Jamie Crawford, “The U.S. Government thinks China
could take down the Power Grid,” CNN.com, November 21, 2014, available at:
http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/20/politics/ns-china-power-grid/.
10
11
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Intelligence, however, also looks increasingly to social media and the global
telecommunications and information technology arena as a source of information,
although determining credibility and coping with its volume remain in many respects
unmet, increasingly difficult, challenges. Knowing which users of social media can or
intend to create mass effects on a population, be it local, national, regional, or global, is
a never-ending issue for intelligence collection and analysis. An added complication is
the dual-edged sword of privacy protection, since the vast majority of Internet users are
without blemish, while others, few in number but powerful in aggregate, use privacy to
conceal their criminality, hostile planning, and extremist recruitment. Moreover, using
social media to uncover threats, to deter criminal and terrorist activity, and to track the
movement and activities of “high value targets” conjures up the needle in a global
haystack metaphor – one which comes nowhere near characterizing the complexity of
this intelligence challenge. And, although law enforcement also tries to exploit social
media to deter crimes and attacks and to identify those in the process of radicalization
and recruitment, such government preventive measures remain difficult to carry out.
They are properly subject to specific judicial and legal constraints, and such collection is
even undermined, at times, by allegations of police entrapment or “fishing
expeditions.”12
A third aspect of information technology and social media of huge concern to
intelligence and to national, homeland, and local security authorities is the ability of
hidden actors to intrude into sensitive computer networks and systems upon which so
much in today’s society depends. This exposure runs the gamut of military systems to
vital public utilities to critical infrastructure to information vaults and public, private,
secret and proprietary databases. The fact that an entity or person in China, Russia,
Nigeria, or even Boise, Idaho can hack surreptitiously into such systems, upon which so
much depends, is the Achilles heel of the global IT world. Indeed, this vulnerability of
our complex web of information technologies and computer-dependent infrastructure to
hostile and hidden intervention by nations, groups, or individuals may well comprise
the single point of failure in U.S. national and homeland security. Our dependence on
things running on electricity or being run by computers is the epitome of modernity –
and the potential scourge of highly developed societies. Trying to communicate using
cell phones after a major storm has wiped out electricity illustrates the point. Now
imagine electricity being lost for millions of Americans for months on end, and the
shape of scenarios in the minds of those who would do us harm takes on clearer, more
frightening, Lord of the Flies contours.
Patterns, Trends and Discontinuities
A mainstay of intelligence analysis has long been discovering and tracking patterns of
behavior and trends in actions. The notion that “past is prologue” continues to typify
much of what intelligence analysts do as they mine information, track groups, and
For a forthright discussion of the strictures and procedures concerning U.S. technical intelligence
collection and sharing, see Michael Hayden [former director of both the National Security Agency and
Central Intelligence Agency], “Balancing Security and Liberty: The Challenge of Sharing Foreign Signals
Intelligence,” Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics, and Public Policy 247 (2005).
12
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search for commonalities in the actions, tactics, and procedures of groups, nations, and
leaders. That linear approach, however, is beset with shortcomings and ripe for failure,
especially in this ever-changing, diverse threat environment. We know that a pitfall
among seasoned analysts is the tendency to fall prey to fixed mindsets. Indeed, experts,
real or self-acclaimed, often are among the least able to abandon their entrenched views
in order to recognize change, not to mention strategic departures from earlier patterns.
Indeed, the ultimate surprises and most costly aspects of intelligence uncertainty are
those acts or developments that constitute a break, or discontinuity, from earlier
patterns and expectations.13
Experience with Islamist and other terrorist groups has shown that they are innovative,
adaptive, and often highly sophisticated. For every counter-measure employed against
them, they seek a new mode or method of attack and of recruitment into their numbers.
Recognizing government capabilities to gain human and technical intelligence against
them, they eschew most hierarchy, embrace operational security, employ alternative
means of communication, and plan their attacks methodically. Intelligence, thus, all too
often seems to be reactive, playing catch up with ever-changing modus operandi, all the
while hard pressed to anticipate the next target by either type or locale.
Threat Range Metamorphosis: The Spectrum is Populated with “D-words”
Until recently, those focused on known or suspected threats to U.S. national security
have centered most of their attention and concerns on destruction, specifically on
weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists, tyrants, or mad men, threats that
admittedly could make the attacks of 9/11 pale by comparison. Such concerns are wellplaced. However, the spectrum of threats and conceivable outcomes or effects is not
limited to outright death and destruction. Indeed, the modern threat spectrum is much
broader. It runs along a continuum essentially as follows:
Devastate – Destroy – Damage – Disable – Deny – Deceive – Disrupt – Disturb
This litany of d-verbs shows how broad is the range of possible outcomes of threatened
actions by malevolent states, groups or individuals.14 Moreover, the one thing virtually
all of them have in common is resorting to continually evolving, advanced technology,
and the ability of various actors from individuals to groups to states to exploit that
technology on a global basis – to attack remotely and often anonymously. Borders are a
See also Bowman H. Miller, “U.S. Strategic Intelligence Forecasting and the Perils of Prediction,”
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 4:27 (2014): 687-701; For insights into the
issue of mindsets and their impediments to “open-mindedness,” see also Richards, J. Heuer, Jr., The
Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1999)
(especially re cognitive biases), and Fisher, Glen, Mindsets: The Role of Culture and Perception in
International Relations, 2nd edition, (Yarmouth, Maine: Intercultural Press, 1997).
14 In his more narrowly focused analysis “Cyber Threats to Critical National Infrastructure: An
Intelligence Challenge,” Martin Rudner also relies on a range of d-designators to describe the “deliberate
[malevolent] actions” directed at computer systems and services, including to “disrupt, deny, deceive,
degrade or destroy….” He goes on, later, to list ten known instances of cyber attacks on critical
infrastructure, as of 2013. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 3:26 (2013),
454, 465-66.
13
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thing of the past in this context, both in state-to-state and domestic versus foreign issues.
While we remain preoccupied with a potential chemical or radioactive assault, others
are capable of shutting down our access to electricity, pure water, reliable transportation,
a sound financial and banking system, and much more.
Besides denying one or more societies the fundamental needs and expectations of
modern life and actual survival, the threat of such actions can and may induce new
levels of fear and loathing among potential target populations. Trust in government, in
intelligence, armed defense, law enforcement, and wise policy will be imperiled, beyond
the mounting doubts and paranoia that already typify significant segments of American
society. Moreover, much of the target set, i.e., critical infrastructure, is in private
ownership and management in the United States. This immensely complicates the issue
of intelligence collection, analysis, and target protection, a complex of issues that the
Department of Homeland Security remains seized with and agonizing over. How to
energize the private sector to take on costly preventive measures while building
relationships of trust and conduits for intelligence provision is an unmet objective.
Devastate. Barring unforeseeable change in the next decade or more, the only perceived
existential threat to the United States, its security and its population, that is manmade
remains the Russian nuclear arsenal and perhaps those of China and North Korea,
although the latter one would fall more accurately under the heading “destruction” in
this threat spectrum taxonomy. For its part, the U.S. WMD Commission concluded in
2005 that today “there are dozens of entities that could strike a devastating blow against
the United States.”15 While the Commission’s wording uses “devastating,” the number
of those with existential threat potential remains very small indeed. For all of their
shock, horror, casualties, and continuing financial costs, the attacks of 9/11 were not
existential.
Destroy. While the destruction that a WMD attack would unleash would be enormous,
it is not the only thing we have to worry about when it comes to the ability to massively
destroy. U.S. infrastructure, heavily dependent on computers and electricity, is
susceptible to actual destruction by outside forces and even the insider threat. Unknown
perpetrators could invade computer systems from afar, rendering them non-functional
in severe cases. Moreover, the ability exists to infect such systems with sleeper
components, which could lie dormant for months or years, only to be activated in a time
of one’s choosing, in a crisis or as an act of war. This ability to carry out massive
destruction is not limited to traditional WMD or to high technology invasions. An
orchestrated attack of arson across a drought-ridden region could cause massive
destruction of forests, grasslands, and the cities and towns they surround. Such would
not constitute even a low-technology attack but nonetheless would be hugely destructive.
Damage. Less abiding or catastrophic than attacks of actual destruction or devastation,
those that can cause damage are very worrisome and both more likely and more
frequent. One only has to consider the elements of our infrastructure that are minimally
Cited in Paul Maddrell, “Failing Intelligence: U.S. Intelligence in the Age of Transnational Threats,”
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 2:22 (2009): 199.
15
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secured or completely unprotected but are vital cogs in America’s economy,
transportation links, and utilities: major bridges, airports, rail hubs, power stations, key
industries, shopping centers (which have already been deemed of terrorist targeting
interest), schools and universities, government centers (e.g., the Murrah Building in
Oklahoma City), sports venues, and the list goes on. While some of these have enjoyed
heightened security awareness and precautions, the range of potential targets is well
beyond the scope of governments and the private sector to monitor and protect. The
same holds for the business of intelligence, i.e., the possible targets of those seeking to
damage things in the United States or elsewhere are literally infinite. “The threat of
cyber crime is pernicious...heightened by the increasing move to digitization...[and]
multiple systems and processes running in parallel are under threat, which could cause
‘widespread harm’.”16 The reality of this national security threat is further reinforced by
President Obama’s issuance in April 2015 of an executive order declaring cyber attacks a
“national emergency” and outlining penalties and sanctions for identified, major
violators.17
Moreover, while the U.S. intelligence community has been pummeled at times for its
lack of imagination when it comes to future threat scenarios, decision-makers need
actual information upon which to act. Imagination is the grist of novelists, screen
writers, and the occasional futurist; it cannot be a mainstay of actionable intelligence.18
“In counterterrorism extrapolation is even more suspect, since organizations are both
heterogeneous and strategic: when air travel was secured after a wave of hostage taking
in the 1970s, they switched to other kinds of attacks; as profiling of terrorists improves
at our borders they switch to recruiting within our borders.”19 To our detriment, the
offensive and selection of targets, as well as the means used in targeting, remain in the
hands of our adversaries, whether they are terrorists, hackers, enemy states, sociopolitical extremists, criminal syndicates, disaffected insiders, lone wolf sociopaths, or
others.
Damage takes on another meaning in this and other contexts as well. Once a threat is
communicated, let alone acted upon, it is government that suffers damage inflicted on
its ability to fulfill the mandate to “provide for the common defense and promote the
general welfare.” Indeed, it is government’s reputation and responsibility for warning,
monitoring, countering, and restoring security and service that suffers each time such
an attack occurs. And with each successive case of damage, the negative appreciation of
Emma Dunkley, “Cyber Crime Thrives on Cost-Cutting Culture,” Financial Times, March 16, 2015, 1,3,
citing Nicola Crawford of the Institute of Risk Management.
17 Dustin Volz, “Obama Declares Cyberattacks a ’National Emergency’,” The National Journal, April 1,
2015, available at: http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/obama-declares-cyber-attacks-a-nationalemergency-20150401.
18 The latest buzzword in intelligence is anticipatory intelligence, but that effort has been underway with
respect to terrorism concerns already for decades. See, inter alia, Charles A. Russell, Bowman H. Miller
and Leon J. Banker, Jr., “Out-Inventing the Terrorist,” An Act to Combat International Terrorism:
Report of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, to Accompany S2236, Report
#95-908, May 23, 1978, 372-430.
19 Eli Berman, et al., “How Empirical Studies of Political Violence (Can) Help Policymakers,” Washington
Post, March 1, 2015, available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkeycage/wp/2015/03/16/how-empirical-studies-of-political-violence-can-help-policymakers/.
16
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governments’ abilities to identify and thwart such damaging attacks gains salience
among a dubious, if not openly fearful, populace. That is the crux of the terrorism
strategy – to produce or threaten violence in order to induce fear in a wider population.
Terrorist psychology works if unaffected observers to an attack extrapolate that event
into believing that the next time an attack takes place, it may be closer to home or even
be directed at them personally. The likelihood that 9/11 could have targeted Rockport,
Maine and Brainerd, Minnesota, instead of New York City and Washington, D.C., is
remote, but that did not quash fears in such places that residents there could be the next
victims. Terrorists want us to believe that “there but for the grace of God go I.”
Deny and Disrupt. While the issue of plausible denial of responsibility for an action is
made more difficult to uncover in the digital age, as Estonia and Georgia have both
experienced, attacks which deny service to a country’s computer systems and
communications networks are real and achievable. Both of those huge, distributed
denial-of-service attacks are attributed to Putin’s Russia given the apparent political
catalysts for launching them. In those cases Russia made little effort to hide their origins,
but such will not be and has not been always the case. Indeed, private groups or
individuals can author such disruptions but deflect attention toward third parties as the
responsible actors, conceivably prompting a misguided, misdirected response or
retaliation. The U.S. military, for its part, worries that, in a future crisis, one or more
enemies may well have the capacity to disrupt communications. Enemies could defeat
the GPS system upon which battle planning and engagement rely. They could deny
service to critical satellite links that provide intelligence, guidance for engagement and
targeting of both manned and unmanned aircraft (UAVs), and they could disrupt
logistics and resupply for U.S. and coalition forces. The party responsible could be one
or more states, but it could also involve surrogates, non-state actors or even hacktivists,
as they have come to be known.
In the massive civilian, private sector, the possibilities to disrupt vital services and
utilities are immense. They are all susceptible to remote attacks to both deny access and
at least temporarily disrupt delivery. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security – still
in the throes of its complicated birthing as one, unified cabinet department – continues
to seek ways to build networks of cooperation, information sharing, training, and
warning between various levels of government and the private sector, which owns most
of the significant infrastructure in the country but lacks the power and mandate to
collect intelligence or enforce laws independently. Finding ways to share with the
private sector more of U.S. warning intelligence and its insights into terrorist planning
and plotting, without sacrificing sensitive sources and methods, remains a dilemma.
Deceive and Disturb. The ability to deceive one’s adversaries has been a feature of
strategy and warfare for ages, long before a Trojan horse appeared. Today that horse is a
virtual one. In his day Saddam Hussein was a master at deception, so much so that he
managed to befuddle UN weapons inspectors, who were intent on uncovering his
presumed WMD program.20 One could argue that his deception was so “successful” that
For a rich accounting of Saddam’s deception tactics, see David Kay, “Denial and Deception Practices of
WMD Proliferators: Iraq and Beyond,” The Washington Quarterly 1:18 (1995): 83-105.
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it helped bring about the U.S.-led intervention in 2003 and Saddam’s eventual undoing,
even as he tried to convince both regional neighbors and the West that he held more
destructive power than appears to have existed. For his part, Russian president Vladimir
Putin insisted for over a year that his country had not invaded eastern Ukraine, but
clearly his forces, masquerading as civilians, were instrumental in organizing and
equipping an armed opposition there. Russian Special Forces have provided the point of
the spear aimed at the Dombas region, even as Crimea was occupied by Russian units.
Deception involving cyber attacks, however, can and does also often constitute outright
theft – of identities, of personal and financial information, of intellectual and
proprietary property, of classified national security and defense data, and the like.
Attempts to penetrate targeted systems involve all manner of deceptive methods, from
spear-phishing and password elicitation via fraudulent emails to intrusive malware and
external hijacking of control over entire computer systems. “The indispensable role that
cyber has come to play in virtually all areas of life renders us all the more vulnerable to
the consequences of an insecure cyber environment.”21 Thus, the U.S. has enlisted
another means to combat its misuse with the Executive Order previously cited. Those
vulnerabilities include theft but also intimidation and extortion, depending on the
motive of the attacker(s).
U.S. intelligence has gone to great lengths and expense in efforts to cut through
deception using the full range of sources and technologies, but the challenge remains
and is growing. States engage surrogates to carry out attacks, to hack into foreign
computers and social media, and to implant malware in targeted systems. While
firewalls and security software seek to ward off such onslaughts, those responsible for
defending against assaults find it enormously difficult, and often impossible, to identify
the origin or responsible party behind such incessant, covert, off-shore targeting.
Moreover, thanks to the ubiquity of the Internet, websites and social media, hostile
groups can now readily avail themselves of worldwide channels to propagandize, recruit,
inspire, and train operatives they will never meet and do not know exist. Convincing
teenagers abroad to take up the ISIS call to action in the name of Islam is part and
parcel of the deceptive tactics that now flood the Internet. In it privacy tends to enjoy
protection regardless of the nature and motivations of Internet users – another bane of
intelligence in service to national security. The notion of cyber warfare, thus, recalls the
metaphor noted earlier, i.e., hordes of venomous vipers are the challenge for U.S.
intelligence now and into the future.
Partial Remedies?
Faced with such daunting challenges, what can the U.S. intelligence enterprise
undertake to ease its task and increase the likelihood of useful penetration of hostile
actors and cogent warning of any of these levels of attack? The arsenal of aids is limited
and not all that promising. But there are some things that would or could help. One is to
partner more widely and effectively with foreign intelligence, security, and law
enforcement agencies on issues of shared anti-threat collection and warning. Much of
21
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that is underway, but the U.S. intelligence culture remains captive to bureaucraticcultural reluctance to share and residual doubts as to other countries’ intelligence
services’ trustworthiness. Risk avoidance must continue to be mediated into risk
management. The cliché that it “takes a network to defeat a network” could not be truer
than in this connection.
Secondly, since there is no way to trace all potential threatening entities and their
intentions or capabilities, a working consensus – arrived at in consultations between
intelligence leaders and political-military-homeland decision-makers – must
continually set and revise priorities for security protection and intelligence targeting. If
every potential target and every non-state actor with known hostile intentions is
considered a priority, there will be no priority on anything at all. How those priorities
are struck remains an issue. “The tools for cyber attacks and biological warfare are
growing ever smaller and ever more accessible…it is not unfeasible that each individual
could have access to their ‘own personal weapons of mass destruction programme’
[sic]…[and] technology means it now only takes one outlier to cause ‘infinitely greater
damage than ever before’.”22 The protection of human life sits astride the top tier of all
concerns, but the threat spectrum contains a widening variety of threats to human life,
from death and destruction to lost access to critical, in many cases, life-sustaining
services. Loss of electricity may pose an inconvenience for thousands who lose it after a
major storm, but that same loss for months on end could well bring loss of life, huge
economic costs, and lost confidence in officialdom.
Thirdly, intelligence has never been a panacea. Informed, vigilant citizens remain a vital
cog in the business of warning of and warding off threats in democratic, rule of law
societies. There is much more that can and should be done to strengthen and mobilize
the private sector-government nexus in everything from sharing intelligence and
warning to buttressing security, both virtual and physical. Moreover, the U.S. populace
and its political leaders, and others among like-minded allies and partners, need to
embrace realistic expectations of what intelligence can and cannot accomplish.23 Most
intelligence analysts, and especially those grappling with terrorism, expect other
destructive attacks as a matter of course since universal coverage, both in gathering
information and protecting conceivable targets, is impossible.
We have to prepare ourselves for dealing adroitly with the aftermath of attacks and
recovery from them, even as we work assiduously to prevent them. Erecting monuments
and memorials for each of them is hardly the answer. In Israel, where such attacks are
now almost the norm, the standard response is to quickly clean up the affected area
after rescuing and evacuating victims, seeking to leave no trace of the incident and
quickly to return to “normal day-to-day life.” The argument is that any commemorations,
e.g., heaps of bouquets and teddy bears, abet the terrorists’ efforts by repeatedly calling
attention to their evils and thus keeping public fears kindled.
Hannah Kuchler, “Spider Drones in the Shower and other Cyber Nightmares,” Financial Times, April 6,
2015: 4.
23 For an astute overview of this challenge, see Mark Lowenthal, “Towards a Reasonable Standard for
Analysis: How Right, How Often on Which Issues?,” Intelligence and National Security 3:23 (June,
2008): 303-315.
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In the final analysis, U.S. intelligence needs the sharpest minds and skills available to
meet these burgeoning 21st century challenges. Intelligence in service to national
security is a noble calling, and the United States needs the country’s best talent engaged
in it. Intelligence needs to exploit partnering, with other American and foreign
counterpart agencies and services, with the private sector, with the media, and with an
informed, more vigilant public to the maximum extent feasible – while protecting its
sensitive sources and methods. And it needs, in the context of the foregoing discussion,
to widen the aperture of its threat assessment lens to better address and cope with
manifold, expanding threats posed by “weapons of mass effects.”
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